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Part XIII.
Part XIII.
The confusion which attends on all such proceedings, they even declare to
be one of their objects, and they hope to secure their constitution by a
terror of a return of those evils which attended their making it. "By this,"
say they, "its destruction will become difficult to authority, which cannot
break it up without the entire disorganization of the whole state." They
presume, that if this authority should ever come to the same degree of power
that they have acquired, it would make a more moderate and chastised use of
it, and would piously tremble entirely to disorganize the state in the savage
manner that they have done. They expect, from the virtues of returning
despotism, the security which is to be enjoyed by the offspring of their
popular vices.
I wish, Sir, that you and my readers would give an attentive perusal to
the work of M. de Calonne, on this subject. It is indeed not only an eloquent,
but an able and instructive, performance. I confine myself to what he says
relative to the constitution of the new state, and to the condition of the
revenue. As to the disputes of this minister with his rivals, I do not wish to
pronounce upon them. As little do I mean to hazard any opinion concerning his
ways and means, financial or political, for taking his country out of its
present disgraceful and deplorable situation of servitude, anarchy,
bankruptcy, and beggary. I cannot speculate quite so sanguinely as he does:
but he is a Frenchman, and has a closer duty relative to those objects, and
better means of judging of them, than I can have. I wish that the formal
avowal which he refers to, made by one of the principal leaders in the
Assembly, concerning the tendency of their scheme to bring France not only
from a monarchy to a republic, but from a republic to a mere confederacy, may
be very particularly attended to. It adds new force to my observations: and
indeed M. de Calonne`s work supplies my deficiencies by many new and striking
arguments on most of the subjects of this letter. ^48
[Footnote 48: See l`Etat de la France, p. 363.]
It is this resolution, to break their country into separate republics,
which has driven them into the greatest number of their difficulties and
contradictions. If it were not for this, all the questions of exact equality,
and these balances, never to be settled, of individual rights, population, and
contribution, would be wholly useless. The representation, though derived from
parts, would be a duty which equally regarded the whole. Each deputy to the
Assembly would be the representative of France, and of all its descriptions,
of the many and of the few, of the rich and of the poor, of the great
districts and of the small. All these districts would themselves be
subordinate to some standing authority, existing independently of them, an
authority in which their representation, and everything that belongs to it,
originated, and to which it was pointed. This standing, unalterable,
fundamental government would make, and it is the only thing which could make,
that territory truly and properly a whole. With us, when we elect popular
representatives, we send them to a council, in which each man individually is
a subject, and submitted to a government complete in all its ordinary
functions. With you the elective Assembly is the sovereign, and the sole
sovereign; all the members are therefore integral parts of this sole
sovereignty. But with us it is totally different. With us the representative,
separated from the other parts, can have no action and no existence. The
government is the point of reference of the several members and districts of
our representation. This is the centre of our unity. This government of
reference is a trustee for the whole, and not for the parts. So is the other
branch of our public council, I mean the House of Lords. With us the king and
the lords are several and joint securities for the equality of each district,
each province, each city. When did you hear in Great Britain of any province
suffering from the inequality of its representation; what district from having
no representation at all? Not only our monarchy and our peerage secure the
equality on which our unity depends, but it is the spirit of the House of
Commons itself. The very inequality of representation, which is so foolishly
complained of, is perhaps the very thing which prevents us from thinking or
acting as members for districts. Cornwall elects as many members as all
Scotland. But is Cornwall better taken care of than Scotland? Few trouble
their heads about any of your bases, out of some giddy clubs. Most of those
who wish for any change, upon any plausible grounds, desire it on different
ideas.
Your new constitution is the very reverse of ours in its principle; and I
am astonished how any persons could dream of holding out anything done in it,
as an example for Great Britain. With you there is little, or rather no,
connexion between the last representative and the first constituent. The
member who goes to the National Assembly is not chosen by the people, nor
accountable to them. There are three elections before he is chosen: two sets
of magistracy intervene between him and the primary assembly, so as to render
him, as I have said, an ambassador of a state, and not the representative of
the people within a state. By this the whole spirit of the election is
changed; nor can any corrective, which your constitution-mongers have devised,
render him anything else than what he is. The very attempt to do it would
inevitably introduce a confusion, if possible, more horrid than the present.
There is no way to make a connexion between the original constituent and the
representative, but by the circuitous means which may lead the candidate to
apply in the first instance to the primary electors, in order that by their
authoritative instructions (and something more perhaps) these primary electors
may force the two succeeding bodies of electors to make a choice agreeable to
their wishes. But this would plainly subvert the whole scheme. It would be to
plunge them back into that tumult and confusion of popular election, which, by
their interposed gradation of elections, they mean to avoid, and at length to
risk the whole fortune of the state with those who have the least knowledge of
it, and the least interest in it. This is a perpetual dilemma, into which they
are thrown by the vicious, weak, and contradictory principles they have
chosen. Unless the people break up and level this gradation, it is plain that
they do not at all substantially elect to the Assembly; indeed they elect as
little in appearance as reality.
What is it we all seek for in an election? To answer its real purposes,
you must first possess the means of knowing the fitness of your man; and then
you must retain some hold upon him by personal obligation or dependence. For
what end are these primary electors complimented, or rather mocked, with a
choice? They can never know anything of the qualities of him that is to serve
them, nor has he any obligation whatsoever to them. Of all the powers unfit to
be delegated by those who have any real means of judging, that most peculiarly
unfit is what relates to a personal choice. In case of abuse, that body of
primary electors never can call the representative to an account for his
conduct. He is too far removed from them in the chain of representation. If he
acts improperly at the end of his two years` lease, it does not concern him
for two years more. By the new French constitution the best and the wisest
representatives go equally with the worst into this Limbus Patrum. Their
bottoms are supposed foul, and they must go into dock to be refitted. Every
man who has served in an assembly is ineligible for two years after. Just as
these magistrates begin to learn their trade, like chimney-sweepers, they are
disqualified for exercising it. Superficial, new, petulant acquisition, and
interrupted, dronish, broken, ill recollection, is to be the destined
character of all your future governors. Your constitution has too much of
jealousy to have much of sense in it. You consider the breach of trust in the
representative so principally, that you do not at all regard the question of
his fitness to execute it.
This purgatory interval is not unfavorable to a faithless representative,
who may be as good a canvasser as he was a bad governor. In this time he may
cabal himself into a superiority over the wisest and most virtuous. As, in the
end, all the members of this elective constitution are equally fugitive, and
exist only for the election, they may be no longer the same persons who had
chosen him, to whom he is to be responsible when he solicits for a renewal of
his trust. To call all the secondary electors of the Commune to account, is
ridiculous, impracticable, and unjust; they may themselves have been deceived
in their choice, as the third set of electors, those of the Department, may be
in theirs. In your elections responsibility cannot exist.
Finding no sort of principle of coherence with each other in the nature
and constitution of the several new republics of France, I considered what
cement the legislators had provided for them from any extraneous materials.
Their confederations, their spectacles, their civic feasts, and their
enthusiasm, I take no notice of; they are nothing but mere tricks; but tracing
their policy through their actions, I think I can distinguish the arrangements
by which they propose to hold these republics together. The first, is the
confiscation, with the compulsory paper currency annexed to it; the second, is
the supreme power of the city of Paris; the third, is the general army of the
state. Of this last I shall reserve what I have to say, until I come to
consider the army as a head by itself.
As to the operation of the first (the confiscation and paper currency)
merely as a cement, I cannot deny that these, the one depending on the other,
may for some time compose some sort of cement, if their madness and folly in
the management, and in the tempering of the parts together, does not produce a
repulsion in the very outset. But allowing to the scheme some coherence and
some duration, it appears to me, that if, after a while, the confiscation
should not be found sufficient to support the paper coinage, (as I am morally
certain it will not,) then, instead of cementing, it will add infinitely to
the dissociation, distraction, and confusion of these confederate republics,
both with relation to each other, and to the several parts within themselves.
But if the confiscation should so far succeed as to sink the paper currency,
the cement is gone with the circulation. In the mean time its binding force
will be very uncertain, and it will straiten or relax with every variation in
the credit of the paper.
One thing only is certain in this scheme, which is an effect seemingly
collateral, but direct, I have no doubt, in the minds of those who conduct
this business, that is, its effect in producing an Oligarchy in every one of
the republics. A paper circulation, not founded on any real money deposited or
engaged for, amounting already to four-and-forty millions of English money,
and this currency by force substituted in the place of the coin of the
kingdom, becoming thereby the substance of its revenue, as well as the medium
of all its commercial and civil intercourse, must put the whole of what power,
authority, and influence is left, in any form whatsoever it may assume, into
the hands of the managers and conductors of this circulation.
In England we feel the influence of the bank; though it is only the
centre of a voluntary dealing. He knows little indeed of the influence of
money upon mankind, who does not see the force of the management of a monied
concern, which is so much more extensive, and in its nature so much more
depending on the managers, than any of ours. But this is not merely a money
concern. There is another member in the system inseparably connected with this
money management. It consists in the means of drawing out at discretion
portions of the confiscated lands for sale; and carrying on a process of
continual transmutation of paper into land, and land into paper. When we
follow this process in its effects, we may conceive something of the intensity
of the force with which this system must operate. By this means the spirit of
money-jobbing and speculation goes into the mass of land itself, and
incorporates with it. By this kind of operation, that species of property
becomes (as it were) volatilized; it assumes an unnatural and monstrous
activity, and thereby throws into the hands of the several managers, principal
and subordinate, Parisian and provincial, all the representative of money, and
perhaps a full tenth part of all the land in France, whice has now acquired
the worst and most pernicious part of the evil of a paper circulation, the
greatest possible uncertainty in its value. They have reversed the Latonian
kindness to the landed property of Delos. They have sent theirs to be blown
about, like the light fragments of a wreck, oras et littora circum.
The new dealers, being all habitually adventurers, and without any fixed
habits or local predilections, will purchase to job out again, as the market
of paper, or of money, or of land, shall present an advantage. For though a
holy bishop thinks that agriculture will derive great advantages from the
"enlightened" usurers who are to purchase the church confiscations, I, who am
not a good, but an old farmer, with great humility beg leave to tell his late
lordship, that usury is not a tutor of agriculture; and if the word
"enlightened" be understood according to the new dictionary, as it always is
in your new schools, I cannot conceive how a man`s not believing in God can
teach him to cultivate the earth with the least of any additional skill or
encouragement. "Diis immortalibus sero," said an old Roman, when he held one
handle of the plough, whilst Death held the other. Though you were to join in
the commission all the directors of the two academies to the directors of the
Caisse d`Escompte, one old, experienced peasant is worth them all. I have got
more information upon a curious and interesting branch of husbandry, in one
short conversation with an old Carthusian monk, than I have derived from all
the Bank directors that I have ever conversed with. However, there is no cause
for apprehension from the meddling of money-dealers with rural economy. These
gentlemen are too wise in their generation. At first, perhaps, their tender
and susceptible imaginations may be captivated with the innocent and
unprofitable delights of a pastoral life; but in a little time they will find
that agriculture is a trade much more laborious, and much less lucrative, than
that which they had left. After making its panegyric, they will turn their
backs on it like their great precursor and prototype. They may, like him,
begin by singing "Beatus ille" - but what will be the end?
Haec ubi locutus foenerator Alphius,
Jam jam futurus rusticus
Omnem relegit idibus pecuniam;
Quaerit calendis ponere.
They will cultivate the Caisse d`Eglise, under the sacred auspices of this
prelate, with much more profit than its vineyards and its corn-fields. They
will employ their talents according to their habits and their interests. They
will not follow the plough whilst they can direct treasuries, and govern
provinces.
Your legislators, in everything new, are the very first who have founded
a commonwealth upon gaming, and infused this spirit into it as its vital
breath. The great object in these politics is to metamorphose France from a
great kingdom into one great play-table; to turn its inhabitants into a nation
of gamesters; to make speculation as extensive as life; to mix it with all its
concerns; and to divert the whole of the hopes and fears of the people from
their usual channels into the impulses, passions, and superstitions of those
who live on chances. They loudly proclaim their opinion, that this their
present system of a republic cannot possibly exist without this kind of gaming
fund; and that the very thread of its life is spun out of the staple of these
speculations. The old gaming in funds was mischievous enough undoubtedly; but
it was so only to individuals. Even when it had its greatest extent, in the
Mississippi and South Sea, it affected but few, comparatively; where it
extends further, as in lotteries, the spirit has but a single object. But
where the law, which in most circumstances forbids, and in none countenances,
gaming, is itself debauched, so as to reverse its nature and policy, and
expressly to force the subject to this destructive table, by bringing the
spirit and symbols of gaming into the minutest matters, and engaging everybody
in it, and in everything, a more dreadful epidemic distemper of that kind is
spread than yet has appeared in the world. With you a man can neither earn nor
buy his dinner without a speculation. What he receives in the morning will not
have the same value at night. What he is compelled to take as pay for an old
debt will not be received as the same when he comes to pay a debt contracted
by himself; nor will it be the same when by prompt payment he would avoid
contracting any debt at all. Industry must wither away. Economy must be driven
from your country. Careful provision will have no existence. Who will labour
without knowing the amount of his pay? Who will study to increase what none
can estimate? Who will accumulate, when he does not know the value of what he
saves? If you abstract it from its uses in gaming, to accumulate your paper
wealth, would be not the providence of a man, but the distempered instinct of
a jackdaw.
The truly melancholy part of the policy of systematically making a nation
of gamesters is this, that though all are forced to play, few can understand
the game; and fewer still are in a condition to avail themselves of the
knowledge. The many must be the dupes of the few who conduct the machine of
these speculations. What effect it must have on the country people is visible.
The townsman can calculate from day to day; not so the inhabitant of the
country. When the peasant first brings his corn to market, the magistrate in
the towns obliges him to take the assignat at par; when he goes to the shop
with his money, he finds it seven per cent. the worse for crossing the way.
This market he will not readily resort to again. The towns-people will be
inflamed; they will force the country people to being their corn. Resistance
will begin, and the murders of Paris and St. Denis may be renewed through all
France.
What signifies the empty compliment paid to the country, by giving it,
perhaps, more than its share in the theory of your representation? Where have
you placed the real power over monied and landed circulation? Where have you
placed the means of raising and falling the value of every man`s freehold?
Those, whose operations can take from, or add ten per cent. to, the
possessions of every man in France, must be the masters of every man in
France. The whole of the power obtained by this revolution will settle in the
towns among the burghers, and the monied directors who lead them. The landed
gentleman, the yeoman, and the peasant, have, none of them, habits, or
inclinations, or experience, which can lead them to any share in this the sole
source of power and influence now left in France. The very nature of a country
life, the very nature of landed property, in all the occupations, and all the
pleasures they afford, render combination and arrangement (the sole way of
procuring and exerting influence) in a manner impossible amongst country
people. Combine them by all the art you can, and all the industry, they are
always dissolving into individuality. Anything in the nature of incorporation
is almost impracticable amongst them. Hope, fear, alarm, jealousy, the
ephemerous tale that does its business and dies in a day, all these things,
which are the reins and spurs by which leaders check or urge the minds of
followers, are not easily employed, or hardly at all, amongst scattered
people. They assemble, they arm, they act, with the utmost difficulty, and at
the greatest charge. Their efforts, if ever they can be commenced, cannot be
sustained. They cannot proceed systematically. If the country gentlemen
attempt an influence through the mere income of their property, what is it to
that of those who have ten times their income to sell, and who can ruin their
property by bringing their plunder to meet it at market? If the landed man
wishes to mortgage, he falls the value of his land, and raises the value of
assignats. He augments the power of his enemy by the very means he must take
to contend with him. The country gentleman therefore, the officer by sea and
land, the man of liberal views and habits, attached to no profession, will be
as completely excluded from the government of his country as if he were
legislatively proscribed. It is obvious, that in the towns, all things which
conspire against the country gentleman combine in favour of the money manager
and director. In towns combination is natural. The habits of burghers, their
occupations, their diversion, their business, their idleness, continually
bring them into mutual contact. Their virtues and their vices are sociable;
they are always in garrison; and they come embodied and half disciplined into
the hands of those who mean to form them for civil or military action.
All these considerations leave no doubt on my mind, that if this monster
of a constitution can continue, France will be wholly governed by the
agitators in corporations, by societies in the towns formed of directors of
assignats, and trustees for the sale of church lands, attornies, agents,
money-jobbers, speculators, and adventurers, composing an ignoble oligarchy,
founded on the destruction of the crown, the church, the nobility, and the
people. Here end all the deceitful dreams and visions of the equality and
rights of men. In "the Serbonian bog" of this base oligarchy they are all
absorbed, sunk, and lost for ever.
Though human eyes cannot trace them, one would be tempted to think some
great offences in France must cry to heaven, which has thought fit to punish
it with a subjection to a vile and inglorious domination, in which no comfort
or compensation is to be found in any even of those false splendours, which,
playing about other tyrannies, prevent mankind from feeling themselves
dishonoured even whilst they are oppressed. I must confess I am touched with a
sorrow, mixed with some indignation, at the conduct of a few men, once of
great rank, and still of great character, who, deluded with specious names,
have engaged in a business too deep for the line of their understanding to
fathom; who have lent their fair reputation, and the authority of their
high-sounding names, to the designs of men with whom they could not be
acquainted; and have thereby made their very virtues operate to the ruin of
their country.
So far as to the first cementing principle.
The second material of cement for their new republic is the superiority
of the city of Paris: and this I admit is strongly connected with the other
cementing principle of paper circulation and confiscation. It is in this part
of the project we must look for the cause of the destruction of all the old
bounds of provinces and jurisdictions, ecclesiastical and secular, and the
dissolution of all ancient combinations of things, as well as the formation of
so many small unconnected republics. The power of the city of Paris is
evidently one great spring of all their politics. It is through the power of
Paris, now become the centre and focus of jobbing, that the leaders of this
faction direct, or rather command, the whole legislative and the whole
executive government. Everything therefore must be done which can confirm the
authority of that city over the other republics. Paris is compact; she has an
enormous strength, wholly disproportioned to the force of any of the square
republics; and this strength is collected and condensed within a narrow
compass. Paris has a natural and easy connexion of its parts, which will not
be affected by any scheme of a geometrical constitution, nor does it much
signify whether its proportion of representation be more or less, since it has
the whole draft of fishes in its drag-net. The other divisions of the kingdom
being hackled and torn to pieces, and separated from all their habitual means,
and even principles of union, cannot, for some time at least, confederate
against her. Nothing was to be left in all the subordinate members, but
weakness, disconnexion, and confusion. To confirm this part of the plan, the
Assembly has lately come to a resolution, that no two of their republics shall
have the same commander-in-chief.
To a person who takes a view of the whole, the strength of Paris, thus
formed, will appear a system of general weakness. It is boasted that the
geometrical policy has been adopted, that all local ideas should be sunk, and
that the people should no longer be Gascons, Picards, Bretons, Normans; but
Frenchmen, with one country, one heart, and one Assembly. But instead of being
all Frenchmen, the greater likelihood is, that the inhabitants of that region
will shortly have no country. No man ever was attached by a sense of pride,
partiality, or real affection, to a description of square measurement. He
never will glory in belonging to the Chequer No. 71, or to any other
badge-ticket. We begin our public affections in our families. No cold relation
is a zealous citizen. We pass on to our neighbourhoods, and our habitual
provincial connexions. These are inns and resting-places. Such divisions of
our country as have been formed by habit, and not by a sudden jerk of
authority, were so many little images of the great country in which the heart
found something which it could fill. The love to the whole is not extinguished
by this subordinate partiality. Perhaps it is a sort of elemental training to
those higher and more large regards, by which alone men come to be affected,
as with their own concern, in the prosperity of a kingdom so extensive as that
of France. In that general territory itself, as in the old name of provinces,
the citizens are interested from old prejudices and unreasoned habits, and not
on account of the geometric properties of its figure. The power and
pre-eminence of Paris does certainly press down and hold these republics
together as long as it lasts. But, for the reasons I have already given you, I
think it cannot last very long.
Passing from the civil creating and the civil cementing principles of
this constitution, to the National Assembly, which is to appear and act as
sovereign, we see a body in its constitution with every possible power, and no
possible external control. We see a body without fundamental laws, without
established maxims, without respected rules of proceeding, which nothing can
keep firm to any system whatsoever. Their idea of their powers is always taken
at the utmost stretch of legislative competency, and their examples for common
cases from the exceptions of the most urgent necessity. The future is to be in
most respects like the present Assembly; but, by the mode of the new elections
and the tendency of the new circulations, it will be purged of the small
degree of internal control existing in a minority chosen originally from
various interests, and preserving something of their spirit. If possible, the
next Assembly must be worse than the present. The present, by destroying and
altering everything, will leave to their successors apparently nothing popular
to do. They will be roused by emulation and example to enterprises the boldest
and the most absurd. To suppose such an Assembly sitting in perfect quietude
is ridiculous.
Your all-sufficient legislators, in their hurry to do everything at once,
have forgot one thing that seems essential, and which I believe never has been
before, in the theory or the practice, omitted by any projector of a republic.
They have forgot to constitute a senate, or something of that nature and
character. Never, before this time, was heard of a body politic composed of
one legislative and active assembly, and its executive officers, without such
a council; without something to which foreign states might connect themselves;
something to which, in the ordinary detail of government, the people could
look up; something which might give a bias, and steadiness, and preserve
something like consistency in the proceedings of state. Such a body kings
generally have as a council. A monarchy may exist without it; but it seems to
be in the very essence of a republican government. It holds a sort of middle
place between the supreme power exercised by the people, or immediately
delegated from them, and the mere executive. Of this there are no traces in
your constitution; and, in providing nothing of this kind, your Solons and
Numas have, as much as in anything else, discovered a sovereign incapacity.
Let us now turn our eyes to what they have done towards the formation of
an executive power. For this they have chosen a degraded king. This their
first executive officer is to be a machine, without any sort of deliberative
discretion in any one act of his function. At best he is but a channel to
convey to the National Assembly such matter as it may import that body to
know. If he had been made the exclusive channel, the power would not have been
without its importance; though infinitely perilous to those who would choose
to exercise it. But public intelligence and statement of facts may pass to the
Assembly with equal authenticity, through any other conveyance. As to the
means, therefore, of giving a direction to measures by the statement of an
authorized reporter, this office of intelligence is as nothing.
To consider the French scheme of an executive officer, in its two natural
divisions of civil and political. - In the first it must be observed, that,
according to the new constitution, the higher parts of judicature, in either
of its lines, are not in the king. The king of France is not the fountain of
justice. The judges, neither the original nor the appellate, are of his
nomination. He neither proposes the candidates, nor has a negative on the
choice. He is not even the public prosecutor. He serves only as a notary to
authenticate the choice made of the judges in the several districts. By his
officers he is to execute their sentence. When we look into the true nature of
his authority, he appears to be nothing more than a chief of bumbailiffs,
sergeants at mace, catch-poles, jailers, and hangmen. It is impossible to
place anything called royalty in a more degrading point of view. A thousand
times better had it been for the dignity of this unhappy prince, that he had
nothing at all to do with the administration of justice, deprived as he is of
all that is venerable, and all that is consolatory, in that function, without
power of originating any process; without a power of suspension, mitigation,
or pardon. Everything in justice that is vile and odious is thrown upon him.
It was not for nothing that the Assembly has been at such pains to remove the
stigma from certain offices, when they are resolved to place the persons who
had lately been their king in a situation but one degree above the
executioner, and in an office nearly of the same quality. It is not in nature,
that, situated as the king of the French now is, he can respect himself, or
can be respected by others.
View this new executive officer on the side of his political capacity, as
he acts under the orders of the National Assembly. To execute laws is a royal
office; to execute orders is not to be asking. However, a political executive
magistracy, though merely such, is a great trust. It is a trust indeed that
has much depending upon its faithful and diligent performance, both in the
person presiding in it and in all its subordinates. Means of performing this
duty ought to be given by regulation; and dispositions toward it ought to be
infused by the circumstances attendant on the trust. It ought to be environed
with dignity, authority, and consideration, and it ought to lead to glory. The
office of execution is an office of exertion. It is not from impotence we are
to expect the tasks of power. What sort of a person is a king to command
executory service, who has no means whatsoever to reward it? Not in a
permanent office; not in a grant of land; no, not in a pension of fifty pounds
a year; not in the vainest and most trivial title. In France the king is no
more the fountain of honour than he is the fountain of justice. All rewards,
all distinctions, are in other hands. Those who serve the king can be actuated
by no natural motive but fear; by a fear of everything except their master.
His functions of internal coercion are as odious as those which he exercises
in the department of justice. If relief is to be given to any municipality,
the Assembly gives it. If troops are to be sent to reduce them to obedience to
the Assembly, the king is to execute the order; and upon every occasion he is
to be spattered over with the blood of his people. He has no negative; yet his
name and authority is used to enforce every harsh decree. Nay, he must concur
in the butchery of those who shall attempt to free him from his imprisonment,
or show the slightest attachment to his person or to his ancient authority.
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