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Part IIISections I - VII.
Sections I - VII.
Section I.
Of Beauty
It is my design to consider beauty as distinguished from the sublime;
and, in the course of the inquiry, to examine how far it is consistent with
it. But previous to this, we must take a short review of the opinions already
entertained of this quality; which I think are hardly to be reduced to any
fixed principles; because men are used to talk of beauty in a figurative
manner, that is to say, in a manner extremely uncertain, and indeterminate. By
beauty I mean that quality or those qualities in bodies, by which they cause
love, or some passion similar to it. I confine this definition to the merely
sensible qualities of things, for the sake of preserving the utmost simplicity
in a subject, which must always distract us whenever we take in those various
causes of sympathy which attach us to any persons or things from secondary
considerations, and not from the direct force which they have merely on being
viewed. I likewise distinguish love (by which I mean that satisfaction which
arises to the mind upon comtemplating anything beautiful, of whatsoever
nature it may be) from desire or lust; which is an energy of the mind, that
hurries us on to the possession of certain objects, that do not affect us as
they are beautiful, but by means altogether different. We shall have a strong
desire for a woman of no remarkable beauty; whilst the greatest beauty in men
or in other animals, though it causes love, yet excites nothing at all of
desire. Which shows that beauty, and the passion caused by beauty, which I
call love, is different from desire, though desire may sometimes operate along
with it; but it is to this latter that we must attribute those violent and
tempestuous passions, and the consequent emotions of the body, which attend
what is called love in some of its ordinary acceptations, and not to the
effects of beauty merely as it is such.
Sect. II.
Proportion Not The Cause Of Beauty In Vegetables
Beauty hath usually been said to consist in certain proportions of parts.
On considering the matter, I have great reason to doubt, whether beauty be at
all an idea belonging to proportion. Proportion relates almost wholly to
convenience, as every idea of order seems to do; and it must therefore be
considered as a creature of the understanding, rather than a primary cause
acting on the senses and imagination. It is not by the force of long attention
and inquiry that we find any object to be beautiful; beauty demands no
assistance from our reasoning; even the will is unconcerned; the appearance of
beauty as effectually causes some degree of love in us, as the application of
ice or fire produces the ideas of heat or cold. To gain something like a
satisfactory conclusion in this point, it were well to examine, what
proportion is; since several who make use of that word do not always seem to
understand very clearly the force of the term, nor to have very distinct ideas
concerning the thing itself. Proportion is the measure of relative quantity.
Since all quantity is divisible, it is evident that every distinct part, into
which any quantity is divided, must bear some relation to the other parts, or
to the whole. These relations give an origin to the idea of proportion. They
are discovered by mensuration, and they are the objects of mathematical
inquiry. But whether any part of any determinate quantity be a fourth, or a
fifth, or a sixth, or a moiety of the whole; or whether it be of equal length
with any other part, or double its length, or but one half, is a matter merely
indifferent to the mind; it stands neuter in the question; and it is from this
absolute indifference and tranquillity of the mind, that mathematical
speculations derive some of their most considerable advantages; because there
is nothing to interest the imagination; because the judgment sits free and
unbiassed to examine the point. All proportions, every arrangement of
quantity, is alike to the understanding, because the same truths result to it
from all; from greater, from lesser, from equality and inequality. But surely
beauty is no idea belonging to mensuration; nor has it anything to do with
calculation and geometry. If it had, we might then point out some certain
measures which we could demonstrate to be beautiful, either as simply
considered, or as relating to others; and we could call in those natural
objects, for whose beauty we have no voucher but the sense, to this happy
standard, and confirm the voice of our passions by the determination of our
reason. But since we have not this help, let us see whether proportion can in
any sense be considered as the cause of beauty, as hath been so generally, and
by some so confidently, affirmed. If proportion be one of the constituents of
beauty, it must derive that power either from some natural properties inherent
in certain measures, which operate mechanically; from the operation of custom;
or from the fitness which some measures have to answer some particular ends of
conveniency. Our business therefore is to inquire, whether the parts of those
objects, which are found beautiful in the vegetable or animal kingdoms, are
constantly so formed according to such certain measures, as may serve to
satisfy us that their beauty results from those measures, on the principle of
a natural mechanical cause; or from custom; or, in fine, from their fitness
for any determinate purposes. I intend to examine this point under each of
these heads in their order. But before I proceed further, I hope it will not
be thought amiss, if I lay down the rules which governed me in this inquiry,
and which have misled me in it, if I have gone astray. 1. If two bodies
produce the same or a similar effect on the mind, and on examination they are
found to agree in some of their properties, and to differ in others; the
common effect is to be attributed to the properties in which they agree, and
not to those in which they differ. 2. Not to account for the effect of a
natural object from the effect of an artificial object. 3. Not to account for
the effect of any natural object from a conclusion of our reason concerning
its uses, if a natural cause may be assigned. 4. Not to admit any determinate
quantity, or any relation of quantity, as the cause of a certain effect, if
the effect is produced by different or opposite measures and relations; or if
these measures and relations may exist, and yet the effect may not be
produced. These are the rules which I have chiefly followed, whilst I examined
into the power of proportion considered as a natural cause; and these, if he
thinks them just, I request the reader to carry with him throughout the
following discussion; whilst we inquire in the first place, in what things we
find this quality of beauty; next, to see whether in these we can find any
assignable proportions, in such a manner as ought to convince us that our idea
of beauty results from them. We shall consider this pleasing power, as it
appears in vegetables, in the inferior animals, and in man. Turning our eyes
to the vegetable creation, we find nothing there so beautiful as flowers; but
flowers are almost of every sort of shape, and of every sort of disposition;
they are turned and fashioned into an infinite variety of forms; and from
these forms botanists have given them their names, which are almost as
various. What proportion do we discover between the stalks and the leaves of
flowers, or between the leaves and the pistils? How does the slender stalk of
the rose agree with the bulky head under which it bends? But the rose is a
beautiful flower; and can we undertake to say that it does not owe a great
deal of its beauty even to that disproportion: the rose is a large flower, yet
it grows upon a small shrub; the flower of the apple is very small, and grows
upon a large tree; yet the rose and the apple blossom are both beautiful, and
the plants that bear them are most engagingly attired, notwithstanding this
disproportion. What by general consent is allowed to be a more beautiful
object than an orange-tree, flourishing at once with its leaves, its blossoms,
and its fruit? but it is in vain that we search here for any proportion
between the height, the breadth, or anything else concerning the dimensions of
the whole, or concerning the relation of the particular parts to each other. I
grant that we may observe, in many flowers, something of a regular figure, and
of a methodical disposition of the leaves. The rose has such a figure and such
a disposition of its petals; but in an oblique view, when this figure is in a
good measure lost, and the order of the leaves confounded, it yet retains its
beauty; the rose is even more beautiful before it is full blown; in the bud,
before this exact figure is formed; and this is not the only instance wherein
method and exactness, the soul of proportion, are found rather prejudicial
than serviceable to the cause of beauty.
Sect. III.
Proportion Not The Cause Of Beauty In Animals
That proportion has but a small share in the formation of beauty, is full
as evident among animals. Here the greatest variety of shapes and dispositions
of parts are well fitted to excite this idea. The swan, confessedly a
beautiful bird, has a neck longer than the rest of his body, and but a very
short tail: is this a beautiful proportion? We must allow that it is. But then
what shall we say to the peacock, who has comparatively but a short neck, with
a tail longer than the neck and the rest of the body taken together? How many
birds are there that vary infinitely from each of these standards, and from
every other which you can fix; with proportions different, and often directly
opposite to each other! and yet many of these birds are extremely beautiful;
when upon considering them we find nothing in any one part that might
determine us, a priori, to say what the others ought to be, nor indeed to
guess anything about them, but what experience might show to be full of
disappointment and mistake. And with regard to the colours either of birds or
flowers, for there is something similar in the colouring of both, whether they
are considered in their extension or gradation, there is nothing of proportion
to be observed. Some are of but one single colour, others have all the colours
of the rainbow; some are of the primary colours, others are of the mixt; in
short, an attentive observer may soon conclude, that there is as little of
proportion in the colouring as in the shapes of these objects. Turn next to
beasts; examine the head of a beautiful horse; find what proportion that
bears to his body, and to his limbs, and what relations these have to each
other; and when you have settled these proportions as a standard of beauty,
then take a dog or cat, or any other animal, and examine how far the same
proportions between their heads and their necks, between those and the body,
and so on, are found to hold. I think we may safely say, that they differ in
every species, yet that there are individuals, found in a great many species
so differing, that have a very striking beauty. Now, if it be allowed that
very different and even contrary forms and dispositions are consistent with
beauty, it amounts I believe to a concession, that no certain measures,
operating from a natural principle, are necessary to produce it; at least so
far as the brute species is concerned.
Sect. IV.
Proportion Not The Cause Of Beauty In The Human Species
There are some parts of the human body that are observed to hold certain
proportions to each other; but before it can be proved that the efficient
cause of beauty lies in these, it must be shown, that wherever these are found
exact; the person to whom they belong is beautiful: I mean in the effect
produced on the view, either of any member distinctly considered, or of the
whole body together. It must be likewise shown, that these parts stand in such
a relation to each other, that the comparison between them may be easily made,
and that the affection of the mind may naturally result from it. For my part,
I have at several times very carefully examined many of those proportions, and
found them hold very nearly or altogether alike in many subjects, which were
not only very different from one another, but where one has been very
beautiful, and the other very remote from beauty. With regard to the parts
which are found so proportioned, they are often so remote from each other, in
situation, nature, and office, that I cannot see how they admit of any
comparison, nor consequently how any effect owing to proportion can result
from them. The neck, say they, in beautiful bodies, should measure with the
calf of the leg; it should likewise be twice the circumference of the wrist.
And an infinity of observations of this kind are to be found in the writings
and conversations of many. But what relation has the calf of the leg to the
neck; or either of these parts to the wrist? These proportions are certainly
to be found in handsome bodies. They are as certainly in ugly ones; as any who
will take the pains to try may find. Nay, I do not know but they may be least
perfect in some of the most beautiful. You may assign any proportion you
please to every part of the human body; and I undertake that a painter shall
religiously observe them all, and notwithstanding produce, if he pleases, a
very ugly figure. The same painter shall considerably deviate from these
proportions, and produce a very beautiful one. And indeed it may be observed
in the master-pieces of the ancient and modern statuary, that several of them
differ very widely from the proportions of others, in parts very conspicuous
and of great consideration; and that they differ no less from the proportions
we find in living men, of forms extremely striking and agreeable. And after
all, how are the partisans of proportional beauty agreed amongst themselves
about the proportions of the human body? Some hold it to be seven heads; some
make it eight; whilst others extend it even to ten; a vast difference in such
a small number of divisions! Others take other methods of estimating the
proportions, and all with equal success. But are these proportions exactly
the same in all handsome men? or are they at all the proportions found in
beautiful women? Nobody will say that they are; yet both sexes are
undoubtedly capable of beauty, and the female of the greatest; which advantage
I believe will hardly be attributed to the superior exactness of proportion in
the fair sex. Let us rest a moment on this point; and consider how much
difference there is between the measures that prevail in many similar parts of
the body, in the two sexes of this single species only. If you assign any
determinate proportions to the limbs of a man, and if you limit human beauty
to these proportions, when you find a woman who differs in the make and
measures of almost every part, you must conclude her not to be beautiful, in
spite of the suggestions of your imagination; or, in obedience to your
imagination, you must renounce your rules; you must lay by the scale and
compass, and look out for some other cause of beauty. For if beauty be
attached to certain measures which operate from a principle in nature, why
should similar parts with different measures of proportion be found to have
beauty, and this too in the very same species? But to open our view a little,
it is worth observing, that almost all animals have parts of very much the
same nature, and destined nearly to the same purposes; a head, neck, body,
feet, eyes, ears, nose, and mouth; yet Providence to provide in the best
manner for their several wants, and to display the riches of his wisdom and
goodness in his creation, has worked out of these few and similar organs and
members, a diversity hardly short of infinite in their disposition, measures,
and relation. But, as we have before observed, amidst this infinite diversity,
one particular is common to many species: several of the individuals which
compose them are capable of affecting us with a sense of loveliness; and
whilst they agree in producing this effect, they differ extremely in the
relative measures of those parts which have produced it. These considerations
were sufficient to induce me to reject the notion of any particular
proportions that operated by nature to produce a pleasing effect; but those
who will agree with me with regard to a particular proportion, are strongly
prepossessed in favour of one more indefinite. They imagine, that although
beauty in general is annexed to no certain measures common to the several
kinds of pleasing plants and animals; yet that there is a certain proportion
in each species absolutely essential to the beauty of that particular kind.
If we consider the animal world in general, we find beauty confined to no
certain measures: but as some peculiar measure and relation of parts is what
distinguishes each peculiar class of animals, it must of necessity be, that
the beautiful in each kind will be found in the measures and proportions of
that kind; for otherwise it would deviate from its proper species, and become
in some sort monstrous: however, no species is so strictly confined to any
certain proportions, that there is not a considerable variation amongst the
individuals; and as it has been shown of the human, so it may be shown of the
brute kinds, that beauty is found indifferently in all the proportions which
each kind can admit, without quitting its common form; and it is this idea of
a common form that makes the proportion of parts at all regarded, and not the
operation of any natural cause: indeed a little consideration will make it
appear, that it is not measure, but manner, that creates all the beauty which
belongs to shape. What light do we borrow from these boasted proportions, when
we study ornamental design? It seems amazing to me, that artists, if they were
as well convinced as they pretend to be, that proportion is a principal cause
of beauty, have not by them at all times accurate measurements of all sorts of
beautiful animals to help them to proper proportions, when they would contrive
anything elegant; especially as they frequently assert that it is from an
observation of the beautiful in nature they direct their practice. I know that
it has been said longasince, and echoed backward and forward from one writer
to another a thousand times, that the proportions of building have been taken
from those of the human body. To make this forced analogy complete, they
represent a man with his arms raised and extended at full length, and then
describe a sort of square, as it is formed by passing lines along the
extremities of this strange figure. But it appears very clearly to me, that
the human figure never supplied the architect with any of his ideas. For, in
the first place, men are very rarely seen in this strained posture; it is not
natural to them; neither is it at all becoming. Secondly, the view of the
human figure so disposed, does not naturally suggest the idea of a square, but
rather of a cross; as that large space between the arms and the ground must be
filled with something before it can make anybody think of a square. Thirdly,
several buildings are by no means of the form of that particular square, which
are notwithstanding planned by the best architects, and produce an effect
altogether as good, and perhaps a better. And certainly nothing could be more
unaccountably whimsical, than for an architect to model his performance by
the human figure, since no two things can have less resemblance or analogy,
than a man and a house, or temple: do we need to observe, that their purposes
are entirely different? What I am apt to suspect is this: that these analogies
were devised to give a credit to the work of art, by showing a conformity
between them and the noblest works in nature; not that the latter served at
all to supply hints for the perfection of the former. And I am the more fully
convinced, that the patrons of proportion have transferred their artificial
ideas to nature, and not borrowed from thence the proportions they use in
works of art; because in any discussion of this subject they always quit as
soon as possible the open field of natural beauties, the animal and vegetable
kingdoms, and fortify themselves within the artificial lines and angles of
architecture. For there is in mankind an unfortunate propensity to make
themselves, their views, and their works, the measure of excellence in
everything whatsoever. Therefore, having observed that their dwellings were
most commodious and firm when they were thrown into regular figures, with
parts answerable to each other; they transferred these ideas to their
gardens; they turned their trees into pillars, pyramids, and obelisks; they
formed their hedges into so many green walls, and fashioned their walks into
squares, triangles, and other mathematical figures, with exactness and
symmetry; and they thought, if they were not imitating, they were at least
improving nature, and teaching her to know her business. But nature has at
last escaped from their discipline and their fetters; and our gardens, if
nothing else, declare we begin to feel that mathematical ideas are not the
true measures of beauty. And surely they are full as little so in the animal
as the vegetable world. For is it not extraordinary, that in these fine
descriptive pieces, these innumerable odes and elegies, which are in the
mouths of all the world, and many of which have been the entertainment of
ages, that in these pieces which describe love with such a passionate energy,
and represent its object in such an infinite variety of lights, not one word
is said of proportion, if it be, what some insist it is, the principal
component of beauty; whilst, at the same time, several other qualities are
very frequently and warmly mentioned? But if proportion has not this power, it
may appear odd how men came originally to be so pre-possessed in its favour.
It arose, I imagine, from the fondness I have just mentioned, which men bear
so remarkably to their own works and notions; it arose from false reasonings
on the effects of the customary figure of animals; it arose from the Platonic
theory of fitness and aptitude. For which reason, in the next section, I shall
consider the effects of custom in the figure of animals; and afterwards the
idea of fitness: since, if proportion does not operate by a natural power
attending some measures, it must be either by custom, or the idea of utility;
there is no other way.
Sect. V.
Proportion Further Considered
If I am not mistaken, a great deal of the prejudice in favour of
proportion has arisen, not so much from the observation of any certain
measures found in beautiful bodies, as from a wrong idea of the relation which
deformity bears to beauty, to which it has been considered as the opposite; on
this principle it was concluded, that where the causes of deformity were
removed, beauty must naturally and necessarily be introduced. This I believe
is a mistake. For deformity is opposed not to beauty, but to the complete
common form. If one of the legs of a man be found shorter than the other, the
man is deformed; because there is something wanting to complete the whole idea
we form of a man; and this has the same effect in natural faults, as maiming
and mutilation produce from accidents. So if the back be humped, the man is
deformed; because his back has an unusual figure, and what carries with it the
idea of some disease or misfortune. So if a man`s neck be considerably longer
or shorter than usual, we say he is deformed in that part, because men are not
commonly made in that manner. But surely every hour`s experience may convince
us, that a man may have his legs of an equal length, and resembling each other
in all respects, and his neck of a just size, and his back quite straight,
without having at the same time the least perceivable beauty. Indeed beauty is
so far from belonging to the idea of custom, that in reality what affects us
in that manner is extremely rare and uncommon. The beautiful strikes us as
much by its novelty as the deformed itself. It is thus in those species of
animals with which we are acquainted; and if one of a new species were
represented, we should by no means wait until custom had settled an idea of
proportion, before we decided concerning its beauty or ugliness: which shows
that the general idea of beauty can be no more owing to customary than to
natural proportion. Deformity arises from the want of the common proportions;
but the necessary result of their existence in any object is not beauty. If we
suppose proportion in natural things to be relative to custom and use, the
nature of use and custom will show, that beauty, which is a positive and
powerful quality, cannot result from it. We are so wonderfully formed, that,
whilst we are creatures vehemently desirous of novelty, we are as strongly
attached to habit and custom. But it is the nature of things which hold us by
custom, to affect us very little whilst we are in possession of them, but
strongly when they are absent. I remember to have frequented a certain place
every day for a long time together; and I may truly say, that so far from
finding pleasure in it, I was affected with a sort of weariness and disgust;
I came, I went, I returned, without pleasure; yet if by any means I passed by
the usual time of my going thither, I was remarkably uneasy, and was not quiet
till I had got into my old track. They who use snuff, take it almost without
being sensible that they take it, and the acute sense of smell is deadened, so
as to feel hardly anything from so sharp a stimulus; yet deprive the
snuff-taker of his box, and he is the most uneasy mortal in the world. Indeed
so far are use and habit from being causes of pleasure, merely as such, that
the effect of constant use is to make all things of whatever kind entirely
unaffecting. For as use at last takes off the painful effect of many things,
it reduces the pleasurable effect in others in the same manner, and brings
both to a sort of mediocrity and indifference. Very justly is use called a
second nature; and our natural and common state is one of absolute
indifference, equally prepared for pain or pleasure. But when we are thrown
out of this state, or deprived of anything requisite to maintain us in it;
when this chance does not happen by pleasure from some mechanical cause, we
are always hurt. It is so with the second nature, custom, in all things which
relate to it. Thus the want of the usual proportions in men and other animals
is sure to disgust, though their presence is by no means any cause of real
pleasure. It is true, that the proportions laid down as causes of beauty in
the human body, are frequently found in beautiful ones, because they are
generally found in all mankind; but if it can be shown too, that they are
found without beauty, and that beauty frequently exists without them, and that
this beauty, where it exists, always can be assigned to other less equivocal
causes, it will naturally lead us to conclude, that proportion and beauty are
not ideas of the same nature. The true opposite to beauty is not disproportion
or deformity, but ugliness: and as it proceeds from causes opposite to those
of positive beauty, we cannot consider it until we come to treat of that.
Between beauty and ugliness there is a sort of mediocrity, in which the
assigned proportions are most commonly found; but this has no effect upon the
passions.
Sect. VI.
Fitness Not The Cause Of Beauty
It is said that the idea of utility, or of a part`s being well adapted to
answer its end, is the cause of beauty, or indeed beauty itself. If it were
not for this opinion, it had been impossible for the doctrine of proportion to
have held its ground very long; the world would be soon weary of hearing of
measures which related to nothing, either of a natural principle, or of a
fitness to answer some end; the idea which mankind most commonly conceive of
proportion, is the suitableness of means to certain ends, and, where this is
not the question, very seldom trouble themselves about the effect of different
measures of things. Therefore it was necessary for this theory to insist,
that not only artificial but natural objects took their beauty from the
fitness of the parts for their several purposes. But in framing this theory,
I am apprehensive that experience was not sufficiently consulted. For, on that
principle, the wedge-like snout of a swine, with its tough cartilage at the
end, the little sunk eyes, and the whole make of the head, so well adapted to
its offices of digging and rooting, would be extremely beautiful. The great
bag hanging to the bill of a pelican, a thing highly useful to this animal,
would be likewise as beautiful in our eyes. The hedge-hog, so well secured
against all assaults by his prickly hide, and the porcupine with his missile
quills, would be then considered as creatures of no small elegance. There are
few animals whose parts are better contrived than those of the monkey; he has
the hands of a man, joined to the springy limbs of a beast; he is admirably
calculated for running, leaping, grappling, and climbing; and yet there are
few animals which seem to have less beauty in the eyes of all mankind. I need
say little on the trunk of the elephant, of such various usefulness, and which
is so far from contributing to his beauty. How well fitted is the wolf for
running and leaping! how admirably is the lion armed for battle! but will any
one therefore call the elephant, the wolf, and the lion, beautiful animals? I
believe nobody will think the form of a man`s leg so well adapted to running,
as those of a horse, a dog, a deer, and several other creatures; at least they
have not that appearance: yet, I believe, a well-fashioned human leg will be
allowed to far exceed all these in beauty. If the fitness of parts was what
constituted the loveliness of their form, the actual employment of them would
undoubtedly much augment it; but this, though it is sometimes so upon another
principle, is far from being always the case. A bird on the wing is not so
beautiful as when it is perched; nay, there are several of the domestic fowls
which are seldom seen to fly, and which are nothing the less beautiful on that
account; yet birds are so extremely different in their form from the beast and
human kinds, that you cannot, on the principle of fitness, allow them anything
agreeable, but in consideration of their parts being designed for quite other
purposes. I never in my life chanced to see a peacock fly; and yet before,
very long before, I considered any aptitude in his form for the aerial life, I
was struck with the extreme beauty which raises that bird above many of the
best flying fowls in the world; though, for anything I saw, his way of living
was much like that of the swine, which fed in the farm-yard along with him.
The same may be said of cocks, hens, and the like; they are of the flying kind
in figure; in their manner of moving not very different from men and beasts.
To leave these foreign examples; if beauty in our own species was annexed to
use, men would be much more lovely than women; and strength and agility would
be considered as the only beauties. But to call strength by the name of
beauty, to have but one denomination for the qualities of a Venus and
Hercules, so totally different in almost all respects, is surely a strange
confusion of ideas, or abuse of words. The cause of this confusion, I imagine,
proceeds from our frequently perceiving the parts of the human and other
animal bodies to be at once very beautiful, and very well adapted to their
purposes; and we are deceived by a sophism, which makes us take that for a
cause which is only a concomitant: this is the sophism of the fly, who
imagined he raised a great dust, because he stood upon the chariot that really
raised it. The stomach, the lungs, the liver, as well as other parts, are
incomparably well adapted to their purposes; yet they are far from having any
beauty. Again, many things are very beautiful, in which it is impossible to
discern any idea of use. And I appeal to the first and most natural feelings
of mankind, whether on beholding a beautiful eye, or a well-fashioned mouth,
or a well-turned leg, any ideas of their being well fitted for seeing, eating,
or running, ever present themselves. What idea of use is it that flowers
excite, the most beautiful part of the vegetable world? It is true, that the
infinitely wise and good Creator has, of his bounty, frequently joined beauty
to those things which he has made useful to us: but this does not prove that
an idea of use and beauty are the same thing, or that they are any way
dependent on each other.
Sect. VII.
The Real Effects Of Fitness
When I excluded proportion and fitness from any share in beauty, I did
not by any means intend to say that they were of no value, or that they ought
to be disregarded in works of art. Works of art are the proper sphere of their
power; and here it is that they have their full effect. Whenever the wisdom of
our Creator intended that we should be affected with anything, he did not
confide the execution of his design to the languid and precarious operation of
our reason; but he enduced it with powers and properties that prevent the
understanding, and even the will; which, seizing upon the senses and
imagination, captivate the soul before the understanding is ready either to
join with them, or to oppose them. It is by a long deduction, and much study,
that we discover the adorable wisdom of God in his works: when we discover it,
the effect is very different, not only in the manner of acquiring it, but in
its own nature, from that which strikes us without any preparation from the
sublime or the beautiful. How different is the satisfaction of an anatomist,
who discovers the use of the muscles and of the skin, the excellent
contrivance of the one for the various movements of the body, and the
wonderful texture of the other, at once a general covering, and at once a
general outlet as well as inlet; how different is this from the affection
which possesses an ordinary man at the sight of a delicate, smooth skin, and
all the other parts of beauty, which require no investigation to be perceived!
In the former case, whilst we look up to the Maker with admiration and praise,
the object which causes it may be odious and distasteful; the latter very
often so touches us by its power on the imagination, that we examine but
little into the artifice of its contrivance; and we have need of a strong
effort of our reason to disentangle our minds from the allurements of the
object, to a consideration of that wisdom which invented so powerful a
machine. The effect of proportion and fitness, at least so far as they
proceed from a mere consideration of the work itself, produces approbation,
the acquiescence of the understanding, but not love, nor any passion of that
species. When we examine the structure of a watch, when we come to know
thoroughly the use of every part of it, satisfied as we are with the fitness
of the whole, we are far enough from perceiving anything like beauty in the
watchwork itself; but let us look on the case, the labour of some curious
artist in engraving, with little or no idea of use, we shall have a much
livelier idea of beauty than we ever could have had from the watch itself,
though the master-piece of Graham. In beauty, as I said, the effect is
previous to any knowledge of the use; but to judge of proportion, we must
know the end for which any work is designed. According to the end, the
proportion varies. Thus there is one proportion of a tower, another of a
house; one proportion of a gallery, another of a hall, another of a chamber.
To judge of the proportions of these, you must be first acquainted with the
purposes for which they were designed. Good sense and experience, acting
together, find out what is fit to be done in every work of art. We are
rational creatures, and in all our works we ought to regard their end and
purpose; the gratification of any passion, how innocent soever, ought only to
be of a secondary consideration. Herein is placed the real power of fitness
and proportion; they operate on the understanding considering them, which
approves the work and acquiesces in it. The passions, and the imagination
which principally raises them, have here very little to do. When a room
appears in its original nakedness, bare walls and a plain ceiling; let its
proportion be ever so excellent, it pleases very little; a cold approbation is
the utmost we can reach; a much worse proportioned room with elegant mouldings
and fine festoons, glasses, and other merely ornamental furniture, will make
the imagination revolt against the reason; it will please much more than the
naked proportion of the first room, which the understanding has so much
approved as admirably fitted for its purposes. What I have here said and
before concerning proportion, is by no means to persuade people absurdly to
neglect the idea of use in the works of art. It is only to show that these
excellent things, beauty and proportion, are not the same; not that they
should either of them be disregarded.
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